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KIT FINE AND TIMOTHY MCCARTHY 
TRUTH WITIIOUT SATISFACTION* 
In his famous paper [7], Tarski gave a definition of truth for a formalized 
language. Unable to perform a direct recursion on the concept itself, he gave 
a definition in terms of satisfaction. This makes it natural to ask if such an 
indirect procedure is necessary or whether a definition of truth can be given 
without using or somehow invoking the concept of satisfaction. 
The question, as it stands, is vague; and later we shall be concerned to 
make it more precise. But even as it stands, it has an obvious technical 
interest. The situation that Tarski found himself in is common in math- 
ematics. We wish to define a certain concept, but unable to perform a direct 
recursion on the concept itself we perform a recursion on a related concept 
of which the given concept is a special case. It would therefore be desirable 
to know when the related concept is necessary, both in the case of truth and 
in general. 
The question may also have some philosophical interest. There is a funda- 
mental difference between the concepts of truth and of satisfaction. The 
former merely applies to certain linguistic units; the latter connects language 
to an ontology of objects, typically extra-linguistic. A negative result on 
defining truth without satisfaction may perhaps constrain formal attempts 
to implement non-referential conceptions of truth. In the present paper, 
however, we will not be concerned in detail with the philosophical aspects 
of our question, although we will from time to time mention some points of 
contact between our discussion and the philosopltical literature. 
Interest in our question dates back to Wallace [9]; and the topic was 
subsequently taken up by Tharp [8] and Kripke [3] (especially Section 10). 
We have made our presentation self-contained, though the reader may 
consult the earlier work for general background and for elucidation of par- 
ticular points. 
The plan of our paper is as follows. Section 1 sets out the general frame- 
work in which our question and its cognates are posed. Section 2 solves the 
questions in case the meta-theory is not required to be finitely axiomatized; 
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and Section 3 gives partial solutions in case finite axiomatizability is 
required, thereby answering a question of Kripke’s [3] and of Tharp’s [8]. 
Finally, Section 4 considers the question under other provisos on the meta- 
theory. 
l.FRAMEWORK 
Our question is: can truth be defined without invoking the notion of satis. 
faction, and, if so, under what circumstances? We shall here set up the 
general framework in which these and related questions can be made 
precise. 
Following Tarski [7], we shall suppose that truth is defined for sentences 
of an object-language and that the definition itself is given in a meta- 
language. We take an object language to be a classical one-sorted first-order 
language L, with finitely many predicates, including identity, and with 
finitely many individual constants and function symbols. We take a meta- 
language for L to be a classical many-sorted first-order language LM. It 
contains finitely many sorts, but at least two: the object-sort, with variables 
x1,x2, *. . ; and the number-sort, with variables ol, 02, . . . . It is with the 
number variables crl, 02, . . . that we talk, via a Giidel numbering, about the 
expressions of L. LM contains three kinds of descriptive constants: those of 
L, but restricted to the object-sort; the standard arithmetical constants, 
restricted to the number-sort; and finitely many additional “semantic” 
constants, without restriction of sort. It will be supposed that the identity 
predicate only relates objects of the same sort, unless otherwise stated. 
It is merely from convenience that we use a many-sorted rather than a 
single-sorted meta-language and that we use variables al, cr2, . . . for 
numbers in place of variables for expressions. Our results could be restated 
under the alternative conventions. 
We take a theory T to consist of a language LT and a set of sentences 
(the axioms) from that language. A theory T for an object-language L will 
be called an object-theory; and a theory M for a meta-language LM will be 
called a meta-theory. It will always be supposed that a meta-theory contains 
the axioms of the system R of Robinson’s arithmetic. This will secure a 
finite basis for a reasonable amount of elementary number theory. 
The meta-theory M will be said to be for the object-language L if the 
me&language L, of M is for L ; and M will be said to be over the 
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object-theory T for L if, in addition, any theorem of T is a theorem of M. 
We shall always use the symbols ‘M’, ‘T’, ‘LM’ and ‘L’ in such a way that 
I-M is the language of M, L the language of T, and M is a meta-theory over T. 
A standard meta-theory for I, is the Tarski theory MC, of satisfaction. 
This adds to the minimal meta-theory for L a third sort of variable, for 
infinite sequences of objects, a two-place function symbol taking sequences 
and numbers into objects, and a satisfaction-predicate relating sequences to 
numbers. The theory Me also contains, as axioms, the standard recursive 
clauses for satisfaction and some statements that specify elementary proper- 
ties of sequences. 
Having specified the meta- and the object-theories, let us say when a 
meta-theory defines truth. We shall discuss two notions of definability, one 
proof-theoretic, and other model-theoretic. In the proof-theoretic sense, we 
shall say that a meta-theory M for L characterizes truth for L, or is a truth- 
theory for L, if for some formula T(Q) of I,M with one free variable (Y, each 
formula 
is a theorem of M for any sentence Q of L. A statement of the form (T) 
will be called a T-sentence. 
In the model-theoretic sense, we suppose given an intended interpre- 
tation or model % for the object-hinguagc L. Any model 8 for LAW .contains, 
in an obvious sense, an object-language part %JjL and an arithmetical part !Bn, 
obtained by restricting the language to L or to arithmetic, respectively. Call 
a model b for Izna arithmetically standard if %n is a standard model for 
arithmetic, and say that 8 respects the model 2I for L if !& = ‘8. Then we 
may say that the meta-theory M implicitly defkes truth for ‘8 if(i) there is 
an arithmetically standard model for M that respects rU and (ii) there is a 
formula T(a) of one free variable a such that each T-sentence with T(a) as 
truth-predicate is true in any arithmetically standard model for M that 
respects ‘%. We might say, in place of (ii), that for any arithmetically stan- - 
dard model gfor M that respects 2l, $FF T(‘Q’) iff % F Q for all sentences 
Q of L. A weaker notion might be obtained by dropping the requirement in 
(i) and (ii) that the models for M be arithmetically standard; but this is not 
a case we shall consider. 
These accounts of what it is to define truth are familiar from the litera- 
turc. The account of implicit definability requires no motivation. However, 
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the account of characterizability is more problematic. If M characterizes 
truth, then, in any arithmetically standard model for M, the formula T(a) 
must receive the intended interpretation. However, it is easy to see that 
the converse does not hold. For example, let M be a finitely axiomatized 
meta-theory for L which does characterize truth for L, and consider any 
true arithmetical statement @ which is independent of R. Suppose that M 
has an arithmetically standard model. Then if ‘3 is any arithmetically stan- 
dard model ofM, the theory axiomatized by R U {a -+ (Al A . . . A A,)), 
whereAl,. . . , A, are the axioms of M, implicitly defines truth for !!I[, but 
fails to characterize truth for L. However, we believe that characterizability 
may be of interest in its own right, independently of its connection to the 
notion of implicit definability. (See, for example, [7]: 187-l 88.) 
Similar definitions may be given for satisfaction, though in this case we 
must take account of the fact that a different number of objects may bc 
said to satisfy a formula. For the proof-theoretic sense, we say that, when 
n > 0, M characterizes n-satisfaction for I,, or is an n-satisfaction theory, 
if there is a formula S,, (xl, . . . ,x,, Q) of LM containing n + 1 free 
variablesx=x,, . . . , x,, CY such that each “S-sentence” 
is a theorem of M for any formula 4(x) of L with at most n free variables 
Xl,...,&. For the model-theoretic sense, we say that M implicitly defines 
n-satisfaction for 91 if(i) there is an arithmetically standard model for M 
that respects 2l, and (ii) there is a formula Sn(x, CY) in the free variables x, CI 
for which each S-sentence is true in any such model. We say that M charac- 
terizes (implicitly defines) satisfaction for L (for 9l) if it characterizes 
(implicitly defines) n-satisfaction for L (for a) for each natural number n. 
With these definitions, our general question can be made precise: when 
does there exist a meta-theory M that characterizes (implicitly defines) 
truth without characterizing (implicitly defining) n-satisfaction for a par- 
ticular n? Our main interest is in characterizability; and in that case, we 
shall call a truth-theory Tarskian, (Tarskian) if it characterizes n-satisfaction 
(n-satisfaction for any n). 
In dealing with this question, we shall consider the effect of imposing 
two further conditions on the meta-theory M. The first is that it should 
contain the theorems of a given object-theory T. The second is that it 
should be finitely axiomatized. 
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The rationale for the first condition is two-fold. First, it is usual to 
define a truth-theory over a given object-theory, and so the condition just 
restricts us to the usual situation. But second, and more importantly, the 
condition may be treated, not as a restriction on a truth-theory, but as a 
way of getting at whether it commits us to a satisfaction theory. Our 
question, it may be argued, concerns our knowledge of (the axioms of) a 
satisfaction theory: of whether, given knowledge of a truth-theory for a 
language, one can thereby know a satisfaction theory for that language. 
Let us suppose that the axioms of the object-theory represent our non- 
scmantical information about the world. Then we wish to ask, given a par- 
ticular truth-theory, whether its axioms, in conjunction with our non- 
semantical information, lead to a satisfaction theory. 
The requirement that the meta-theory be finitely axiomatized can also 
be motivated in different ways. One motivation is that it is a necessary 
(and perhaps a necessary and sufficient) condition for the intuitive require- 
ment that the theory provide a recursive theory of truth. Another motiva- 
tion sometimes claimed for the finiteness requirement is that finiteness is 
required in order to explain how a finite mind can come to know an infinity 
of T-sentences (see, for example [ 1 I). Certainly, finiteness does serve this 
purpose; although it is not clear why, in the absence of additional con- 
straints, a perspicuous recursive axiomatization should not serve this 
purpose as well as a finite axiomatizdtion. 
2. WITHOUT FINITENESS 
Given an object theory T, we wish to know when there exists a non- 
Tarskian, truth-theory (without further restriction) over T. Although this 
case is comparatively trivial, its study will prove fruitful in consideration of 
the finite case. 
Relative to the object-theory T, there is a trivial m&a-theory MT for T, 
obtained by introducing a new one-place predicate T(a) (applying only to 
numbers) and adjoining to T the axioms of Robinson’s arithmetic and all 
T-sentences for sentences of LT. lt is clear that MT characterizes truth for 
LT; it is, in an obvious sense, the least committal of all truth-theories for T. 
Our question is now as to when the trivial truth theory for T is non- 
Tarskian, . 
Rather than answer this question directly, we shall find it helpful to 
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consider a more general question concerning “segregated” truth-theories. 
Call an n-place predicate P of a many-sorted language uniform if it only 
applies to n variables ZJ r, . . . , v,, to yield a formula Pv r . . . v, when all of 
01,. *. , vu, are of the same sort, and call an n-place function symbol f 
uniform, n > 0, if it only applies to n variables v,, . . . , v, to form a term 
fv,... v,whenv,,...,v,andfvl...v,areallofthesamesort.Wc 
then say that a many-sorted language (or a theory based thereon) is 
segregated if all of its predicates (including identity) and all of its function 
symbols are uniform. The intuitive significance of the notion of uniformity 
for meta-theories is that a segregated meta-theory does not enable one to 
express, at the level of the primitives of the language, any connection 
between the world and language, i.e., between the objects as represented 
by thevariablesxl,xl,. . . and the expressions as represented by 
CY], Q2,. . . . It should be clear that the trivial meta-theory is segregated, 
since the non-logical constants of the object-language and of arithmetic arc 
uniform and since the sole semantic primitive T(o) is also uniform. 
Call a formula 4 single-sorted if all of the terms of @ are of the same 
sort. Then a fundamental fact concerning segregated languages is the 
following: 
LEMMA 1 ( SEGREGATION). Any formula 4 of a segregated language is 
logically equivalent to a truth-functional compound of single-sorted 
formulas. 
PTouf: By induction on the complexity of @. The basis is given by the 
assumption that each predicate and function symbol is uniform. The truth- 
functional cases are trivial. Now suppose that 4 is of the form 3x$. By the 
induction hypothesis, $ is equivalent to a truth-functional compound $’ 
of single-sorted formulas. Put J/’ in disjunctive normal form and distribute 
3x across the disjunction. Then Jt’ is equivalent to a disjunction of formulas 
of the form 3x A:=, xi, with each Xi single-sorted. Suppose that XI, . . . , 
x,,, , m < n, are the Xi's that contain free occurrences of x. Then 3x A;= r xi 
is equivalent to 3~ A?=, Xi A Ay=,,,+r xi. But it is clear that 3~ Ay=r x is 
single-sorted, and so the result is proved. 
It should be noted that the logical equivalent produced by the proof 
contains the same free variables as @. 
The result may be strengthened in two directions. As it stands, the 
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identity predicate is required to be uniform. However, the result still holds 
with a universal identity-predicate (applying to objects of all sorts), as long 
as there are axioms that insure that the different domains are disjoint. This 
means then that the result can be transferred to a single-sorted theory 
under the standard translation. 
Second, a modified conclusion can be reached without full segregation. 
Say two sorts are directly connected if they are connected, in the obvious 
sense, by a predicate or function symbol, and say two sorts are connected 
if they are linked by a sequence of direct connections. Call a formula 
connected if any two of its terms have connected sorts. Then it may be 
shown, in the same way as before, that each formula is equivalent to a truth- 
functional compound of connected formulas. 
Let us say that the object theory T is finitely n-typed with respect to the 
formulas Gl(x), Q,(x), . . . , &(x) in the free variables x = xl, . . . ,x, iff, 
for any formula Q(x) of I, with the free variables x, the sentence VF= 1 
vx[$(x) = &(x)1 is a theorem of T. It should be clear that the condition 
of being finitely n-typed is equivalent to the standard model-theoretic 
condition of admitting only finitely many n-types. 
Let MIZ, be the theory with language I, and with the closed theorems of 
M in the language L as axioms. Then a necessary condition for a segregated 
meta-theory to characterize n-satisfaction is: 
LEMMA 2. Let M bc a segregated meta-theory. Then M characterizes n- 
satisfaction, rz > 0, only ifMlL is finitely n-typed. 
Buuf: Suppose that M is segregated and characterizes n-satisfaction by 
means of the formula &(x, CY). Since M is segregated, there is a truth- 
functional form Cp such that: 
(1) lx vx~@,(x, a) = @(til(X), . . . , hz(x), 
Xl(&), . . . 7 xm>1, 
where the .&i(x) are formulas with only object language variables and the 
+j((Y) are formulas with only variables of other sorts. Let T be the formula 
Wx,(xl = x1) of L and let 1 be its negation. Now let qI(x), . . . , @J,(X) be 
the result of substituting all possible distributions of T and 1 for the x,(ol)‘s 
in Q(+ I(X), . . . : $k(x), xl(a), . . . , xl (a)) (2’ cases in all). Then we show 
that M is finitely typed with respect to the formulas &(x), . . . , &(x). For 
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choose any formula H(x) of L with Code1 numberg. Since M characterizes 
n-satisfaction, 
(2) livf ws”(x,a = @tx)l. 
So from (1) and (2) 
(3) lx W~(x> = @(ihI (4, . . * 9 h?w, XlQ), . f . 9 xl@))). 
But the x do not occur in the tiig). So from (3) by quantificational logic: 
(4) h ip, vx(G(x) E +i(x)); 
and we are done. 
By examining the proof, we see that the hypothesis of the lemma can 
be weakened to the requirement that the object- and number-sorts be 
unconnected. 
Under the assumption that M is a truth-theory, a converse to Lemma 2 
can be established: 
LEMMA 3. Let M be a truth-theory. Then M characterizes n-satisfaction 
if MIL is finitely n-typed. 
hoof: Let the truth-predicate for M be T(a), and suppose that MIL is 
finitely typed with respect to the formulas @r(x), . . . , G,(x) of L, so that 
for any formula @(x) of I, with at most n free variables x = xl, x2, . . . ,x,, 
(1) hJ iF, vxttix) s @iCx))- 
Let u(a, /3) be a term of arithmetic (or a conservative extension thereof) 
that represents in R a primitive recursive function u(m, n) such that, for 
any formulas Q, and J/ of L, u(r@l, ‘IL’) is the Code1 number of the closure 
of@= $. Letg,, . . . ,g, be the Godel numbers of @r(x), . . . , r&,,(x), and 
let L&(X, a) be the formula Vim_ r [T(Lr(o, gi)) A @i(x)]. Choose any formula 
g(x) of L with free variables from x; suppose that its Code1 number isg. 
Then by definition of&(x, a): 
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From the derivability of the T-sentences and the fact that U represents the 
recursive function u, we have: 
(3) 
But then from (1) and (3), it follows that: 
(4) lx Kdx,E) = SW 
as required. 
It may be of help to think of this result in the following way. Given dis- 
junction.over countable collections of formulas, satisfaction for a finitary 
language L may be defined in terms of truth. For let {@r(x), G,(x), . . . > be 
an enumeration of all the formulas of L in the free variables x =x1, . . . 7 
x,. We may define n-satisfaction by the formula VE <w r@(x) A a = 
‘Q&X)‘]. Such an infinitary expression is not available in our meta-language 
LM. But the hypothesis of the lemma shows how it may be replaced by a 
finitary disjunction of the same sort. (We are indebted to Alasdair Urquhart 
for this observation.) 
Lemmas 9 and 3 may be put together to give a necessary and sufficient 
condition for a segregated truth-theory to characterize n-satisfaction. 
THEOREM 4. Let M be a segregated truth-theory (or one in which the 
object and number sorts arc unconnected). Then M characterizes II- 
satisfaction iffM]L is finitely n-typed. 
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 4: we obtain: 
COROLLARY 5. Let M be a segregated truth-theory. T!lcn M character- 
izes satisfaction iff MI L is finitely n-typed for each n. 
According to a result of Ryll-Nardzewski’s [5] (see also [OJ, pp. lOl- 
103), a theory is &-categorical iff it is consistent, complete and admits 
only finitely many tz-types for each II. Now it is readily shown that a theory 
admits only finitely many n-types iff all of its complete and consistent 
extensions admit only finitely many rz-types. Therefor-e the condition in 
Corollary 5 may be replaced by the condition that all of the consistent and 
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complete extensions of MIL, are &-categorical. It is interesting that the 
condition that arises naturally in the formulation of the corollary should 
connect up so well with a condition of quite independent interest in model 
theory. 
Let us now apply these results to the trivial mcta-theory MT. It is clear 
that MT is segregated and is a truth-theory. The other important feature of 
MT in the prksent context is: 
LEMMA 6. MT is a conservative extension of the object-theory T, i.e., for 
any sentence 4 of L, if b, @ then h, @. 
Proof: Suppose not b. 4. Then for some model II’of T, not 9[ /= @. 
Extend ‘8 to a structure $9’ for the language of MT by adjoining the stan- 
dard arithmetical part and the intended interpretation for T(a). Then eis 
a model for MT, but not Ep!= 9. Therefore not b, $J. 
A simple syntactic proof may also bc given. 
This result means that for the case of M = MT, M[ L in the condition of 
Corollary 5 can bc replaced with T. That is: 
COROLLARY 7. The trivial meta-theory MT characterizes n-satisfaction 
iff T is finitely n-typed. 
We can ow give a necessary and sufficient condition for there to exist a 
non-Tarskian, truth-theory over a given object-theory. 
THEOREM 8. There is a non-Tarskian, truth-theory over Tiff T is not 
finitely n-typed. 
Proofi For the left-to-right direction, use Lemma 3; and for the right-to- 
left direction, let M bc MT and use Corollary 7. 
It may be shown that, for each n > 1, we may obtain a truth-theory that 
characterizes n-satisfaction but not (n + I)-satisfaction. In the light of 
Corollary 7, it suffices to produce a theory T" that is finitely n-typed but 
not finitely (n + I)-typed. But this follows from the result of [4], according 
to which there is, for each n > 0, a structure %” that realizes finitely many 
n-types yet infinitely many (n + I)-types. For later purposes, we may note 
that the theory T" = Th(BR) may be taken to be decidable. 
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When we apply Theorem 8 to the case in which T is a logic (no non- 
logical axioms), we get conditions concerning truth-theories for a language. 
The critical question is: When is a logic for a given language finitely n- 
typed? Call a language pure& nzonu&c if its only non-logical constants are 
monadic predicates and individual constants. Then the answer to one 
direction of our question is given by: 
LEMMA 9. For any iz > 0, the logic T for a language L is finitely n-typed 
if L is purely monadic. 
Proof: Straightforward. Use, for example, a normal form theorem for 
the monadic predicate calculus, Note, however, that it is essential to use 
our underlying assumption that the slack of non-logical primitives of L is 
finite. 
For the other direction we shall establish. for later purposes, a stronger 
result than is required here: 
LEMMA IO. If the language L is not purely monadic, then there is an 
axiomatized, consistent and complete theory phrased in L that is not 
finitely !z-typed for any n > 0. 
PKIO~: Let S be the theory of successor, i.e., of the structure (w,f‘) for 
f: w --, w the successor function: Ls contains the single non-logical func- 
tion symbol s. We observe that Scan bc axiomatized (cf. [0], pp. 159-160). 
Also, S is not finitely 1 -typed and hence not finitely rr-typed for any r~. For 
let I$,&) be the formula V>$x # SJ~) and let ;i/,+ ,(x) be the formula 
3y($&v) A x = SJJ). Then G,(x) is satisfied by n alone in t w, f) and so 
$J,(x) and i,,(x) are not provably co-extensive in S if m f n. 
We now show how a theory Tin L can be mutually interpreted in S. 
Suppose first that L contains an rz-place function symbol, g, II > 0. WC set 
up two translations ‘T and u, from Ls to I. and from I, to Ls, respectively. 
For any formula $ of Ids, let ~(4) be the result of replacing each occurrence 
A 
of.st in Q withgt . . . r; and for any formula 3 of L. let a(@) be the result 
of replacing each term gtr . . . r,, , IZ > 0. with st r , each individual constant 
a with the individual description LY~/)‘(x = s-v) (subsequently eliminated 
from the resulting formula in the usual way), and each atomic formula 
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Pt, . . . t,, for Pa non-logical predicate ofL, with r. Let T be the theory 
whose axioms arc (i) the translations r($) of the axioms from a recursive 
basisforS,(ii)Vxr . ..x.Pxr.. .xnr for any n-place non-logical predicate 
PofL,(iii)~x~xz...x,~~z...y,(kuxz...x,=gxy,...y,),forany 
m-place function symbol h, m > 0, and (iv) Vxr . . . x,(a #tfxr . . .x,) for 
any individual constant a. Then it may be shown, either model- or proof- 
theoretically, that the theories S and Tare mutually interpretable with 
respect to the translations u and r, i.e., that ks $I implies h, r(e), l-r J, 
implies bs o(G), and that ks 4 E @T(G)), hI J/ - r(a(+)) for any formulas 
# and I,!I of Ls and L, respcctivcly. From this, it readily follows that T is 
consistent, complete and not finitely l-typed, given that the same is true 
OfS. 
In case L contains no n-ary function symbols, for n > 0, but only n-adic 
predicates, for n > 1, the proof may be modified by interpreting the func- 
tion symbol g above as a predicate in the usual way. 
Fr-om Lemmas 9 and 10, we obtain: 
LEMMA 1 1. For any n > 0, the logic T for I, is finitely n-typed iff L is 
purely monadic. 
Theorem 8 with Lemma 1 I now gives: 
THEOREM 12. There is a non-Tarskian, (or non-Tarskian) truth-theory 
for the language L iff I, is not purely monadic. 
Although we have concentrated on the concept of characterizability, 
similar results can be proved for implicit definability. For any structure a[, 
let Th(%) be the theory with the language LX of ‘% and with the sentences 
$I in LX such that 2l+ 4 as axioms. Then in analogy to Theorem 4 (and by 
an analogous proof) we have: 
THEOREM 13. Let ‘$I be a structure for the language L and let M be a 
segregated meta-theory for L that implicitly defines truth for %. Then M 
implicitly defines n-satisfaction for 9l iff Th(lI) is finitely n-typed (i.e., 
iff 9l realizes only finitely many n-types). 
From Theorem 13 the analogues of Corollary 7 and Theorem 8 then 
readily follow: 
TRUTII WITIiOUT SATISFACTIOK 409 
THEOREM 14. Let T be the logic for the language L. Then the trivial 
mcta-theory MT implicitly defines n-satisfaction for the interpretation 91 
of L iff ?I realizes finitely many n-types. 
THEOREM 15. There is a meta-theory M that implicitly defines truth but 
not n-satisfaction for 9I iff U realizes infinitely many n-types. 
We see then that there is no essential difference in the conditions con- 
cerning implicit definability for a structure 9I and characterizability over 
the theory Th(‘U). 
3. WITH 1:INITENESS 
WC now consider the case in which the meta-theory is required to be 
finitely axiomatizable. In this case, the trivia1 meta-theory MT will not do 
to prove our results. Indeed, it is easily shown that MT, for a consistent 
theory T, has no finite axiomatization on the basis of T. Therefore another 
method must be used to obtain the non-Tarskian truth-theories. The under- 
lying idea here is to produce a provability interpretation for the notion of 
truth. 
First an auxiliary result: 
LEMMA 16. Suppose that the object-theory T has a consistent, complete 
and axiomatizable extension. Then there is a finitely axiomatized theory 
T* in an expanded language whose restriction T* II, to the language L of T 
is a consistent, complete (and, of course, axiomatizablc) extension T’ of T. 
JYoof: We distinguish two cases. (i) T has a finite model ‘$I. A single 
sentence Q then describes % up to isomorphism. Let T1 be the theory in 
the language L whose sole axiom is 9. Then it is clear that T* is a finitely 
axiomatized, consistent and complete extension of 7: (ii) T has only 
infinite models. Choose an axiomatizable, consistent and complete exten- 
sion T’ of T. Then T+ has only infinite models. Therefore by a result of 
Kleene’s [2] (proved using Tarski’s theory of truth!), T’ can be finitely 
axiomatized by a theory T* in an expanded language; and so we are done. 
We now give a sufficient condition for a finitely axiomatizable meta- 
theory to characterize truth. 
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LEMMA 17. Suppose that the object-theory T has a consistent, complete 
and axiomatizable extension (i.e., T is not essentially undecidable). Then 
there is a consistent, finitely axiomatized and segregated truth-theory M 
over T. 
Proof: By the supposition and Lemma 16, there is a finitely axiomatiz- 
able theory T* in an expanded language whose restriction to L is a con- 
sistent and complete extension T’ of T. Let G be the set of Code1 numbers 
of theorems of T’, and let T(a) be a formula of the language of R that 
numeral-wise represents C. ThenM has as axioms those of T*, R and the 
consistency statement A for the provability predicate T(a). The result will 
be consistent as long as a new sort of variable is used to formulateA and 
the axioms of R. 
Clearly M is segregated and finitely axiomatized. So it remains to show 
that M characterizes truth. Pick a sentence @I of L. By the completeness of 
T+, either h 4 or b - 9. If FM 4, then b T(r@‘) by representability for - 
T(a), and so b T(r@‘) E $. If b - 4, then tM T(‘- #‘), again by represcn - 
tability, &vr - T(v), from the consistency axiom A, and so b qr@‘) - 4. 
So, in either case, the T-sentence is derivable. 
We may note that for this truth-theory the proof of the T-sentences is 
a kind of cheat, with the truth-value of either side of the equivalence 
established independently of the other. 
A converse to Lemma 17 can also be proved. 
LEMMA 18. Suppose that there is a consistent, finitely axiomatizable and 
scgregatcd truth-theory for T. Then T has a consistent, complete and 
axiomatizable extension T’. 
Proof: Let M he the given meta-theor-y for Tand T(a) the truth- 
predicate or formula for M. Then M may he obtained from K by the 
addition of a single “semantical” axiom $. By the Segregation Lemma, 
@ and T(a) are equivalent to truth-functional compounds of single-sorted 
for~ulas~~(J/~,...,J/~,x,,...,x~)and~’(~h+l,..-,~m,xt+f(a),..., 
x,(01)), respectively, where the Gi’s contain object-language terms and the 
xi’s do not. It is then clear that for some distribution 7rl, . . . , nm, 
=,+I,.-., n,, 1 of blanks or negation-signs, the result of adding the 
axioms~l~lr-..,~m~m,~~+,x,,..., 7-r, + Ifi is a consistent extension 
M* ofM. 
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Let T* be the result of adding n,$i, . . . , T,$J,,, to T (note that the 
$/i’s may contain new non-logical constants): and let T+ be the restriction 
of T* to the language L. It is clear that T+ is consistent, since M* is. Also, 
T+ is complete. For suppose not l-r+ Q and not h.- - @, for some sentence 
Q of L. Then not b.* Q and not l--+ - Q. So for some models 2I and 2I’ of 
T*, not ‘u I= Q and not ‘3’ b - 9. SinceM* is consistent, there is a model 
gfor the axioms nm + rx,, . . . , n, + lxr and Robinson’s arithmetic R. Let 
Band 23’ be the result of combining ‘3 and ‘u’, respectively, with g. Then 
sand 23’ are both models for M*. Since 23 and 8’ share gand satisfy - 
rk+ltik+1.. . . ,flmtim, they both assign the same truth-values to T(‘@‘); 
yet they assign different truth values to $J. Therefore they assign differing 
truth-values to the T-sentence T(p) E 6, contrary to the fact that the 
extension M* ofM characterizes truth. 
Finally, WC may show that T’ is axiomatizable. For: 
(1) h* T(@ iff !x* 9, 
since M* characterizes truth. Also, 
(2) I-M*@ iff h-+9 
by the completeness of T+ and the consistency of M*. So 
- 
(3) b,* T(r@‘) iff b+$. 
- 
But since M* is finitely axiomatizable, the set {‘c$‘: hr* T(‘Q’)) is recur- 
sively enumerable; and so T+ is axiomatizable. 
It should be clear from the proof that the condition of M’s being segre- 
gated can bc replaced by the weaker condition of the number- and object- 
sorts being unconnected. Philosophically, the result is suggestive; for it 
shows that a connection must be made between language and the world 
if truth is to be defined over theories, such as formal arithmetic, that 
admit of no consistent, complete and axiomatizablc extension, i.e., theories 
which are essentially undecidable. llowever, it is far removed from showing 
that language must be linked to the world by anything recognizable as a 
satisfaction-predicate. 
Putting Lemmas 17 and 18 together gives: 
THEOREM 19. There is a consistent, finitely axiomatizable and segregated 
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truth-theory M for Tiff T enjoys a consistent, complete and axiomatizablc 
extension. 
The “provability” theory M of Lemma 17 is not as useful as the trivial 
theory MT in constructing non-Tarskian truth-theories; for whereas MT is a 
conservative extension of T, M in general is not. However, we may still 
construct a non-Tarskian example under an additional supposition on T: 
THEOREM 20. Let n > 0 be given. Suppose that T has a complete and 
axiomatizable extension T’ that is not finitely n-typed. Then there is a non- 
Tar&an, finitely axiomatized truth-theory M over T 
Proof Let the Tin Lemma 17 be the T’ here. Choose the M of 
Lemma 17. Then M is finitely axiomatized and characterizes truth. Since 
M consistently extends T’ and T’ is complete, M is a conservative exten- 
sion of T’. So since T+is not finitely n-typed, the restriction Mlf. ofM to L 
is also not finitely n-typed. But M is segregated; and so by Lemma 2, it does 
not characterize n-satisfaction. 
There exist numerous theories that satisfy the hypothesis of Theorem 20. 
Examples include logics that are not purely monadic, the theory of linear 
order, and certain algebraic theories, such as the theories of real closed and 
algebraically closed fields. Therefore the theorem settles a question of 
Tharp [8] and Kripke 131, p. 401, as to whether there exists a finitely 
axiomatizable non-Tarskian truth-theory. WC may also note, in the light 
of the observation following Theorem 8, that there exists, for each n = 
I, 2, . . _ , a finitely axiomatized truth theory that characterizes n- 
satisfaction but not (n + 1)satisfaction. 
The condition on Tin Theorem 20 is not very perspicuous; but it is hard 
to see how it can be simplified. Certainly, it is not equivalent to the con- 
dition that T not be finitely n-typed but enjoy a maximally consistent and 
axiomatizable extension. For let T be the theory that results from dis- 
joining the conjunction $J of axioms for dense linear ordering without 
end-points with an axiom J/ (in the same predicates) for a theory T,J, that 
is essentially undecidable and not finitely n-typed. Then T has a maximally 
consistent and axiomatizable extension, viz. the result Tti of adding the 
axiom 4. Also, T is not finitely n-typed, since the stronger theory T+ is 
not. However, any consistent, complete and axiomatizable extension 
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T’ of Twill bc deductively equivalent to To and hence be finitely n- 
typed. 
The non-Tarskian theory M constructed in Theorem 20 may seem in 
one respect rather odd. For if we follow through the proof of the Kleene 
result used in Lemma 16 and hence in Lemma 17, we see that a Tarskian 
theory of truth may be embedded in the theory M, but with the object- 
language variables doubling up as the variables for Gadel numbers. Thus the 
S-sentences may be provable in the meta-theory once the names for the 
formulas of L are taken to be terms from LM of the same sort as the object 
variables. This is not a contradistinction to our claim that M fails to be a 
satisfaction theory, since that requires that the names in the S-sentences be 
taken from the language of R. So we see that the notions of a truth or satis- 
faction theory are very sensitive to the system adopted for naming the 
sentences of the object-language. 
It might be thought that this relativity somewhat detracts from the 
interest of our example in Theorem 20. After all, the S-sentences can be 
derived, though under a different system of naming. But two points need 
to be set against this objection. First, as long as it is assumed that the 
extension T’ is itself’ finitely axiomatizable, the appeal to Kleene’s result 
can be avoided. Second, our interest in constructing a truth-theory may 
concern a particular system of naming; for under the intended interpre- 
tation of the language, it is only certain terms that will be regarded as 
naming expressions and so it is with reference to these that we would like 
to derive the T-sentences. 
AU the same, there may be some interest attaching to the concept of 
being a truth or satisfaction theory under sume system of naming sentences. 
One would then like to know when there exists a truth theory that charac- 
terizes truth under one system of naming and yer fails to characterize 
satisfaction under an,v system of naming (the same or not). The negative 
part of such a claim, though, would seem to present peculiar difficulties; 
since, for suitably weak object-theories, there may be a system of naming 
from the ontology of the theory itself for which the S-sentences could be 
derived. 
Theorem 20 does not give necessary and sufficient conditions. However, 
the result can be reversed in case T itself is consistent, complete and 
axiomatizable: 
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THEOREM 21. For T consistent, complete and axiomatizable, there is a 
non-Tarskian, finitely axiomatized truth-theory over Tiff T is not finitely 
n-typed. 
Proof: e=. By Theorem 20. 
*.ByLemma3. 
Even when T is finitely n-typed for each n = 1,2, . . . , there may be no 
uniform method of obtaining a formula &(x, a) that characterizes n- 
satisfaction. For it follows from the general result of [6], that there exists 
a structure ‘8 such that (i) the theory Th(%) is decidable, (ii) ‘8 realizes 
only finitely many n-types for each n (i.e., 2I is &,-categorical) and yet 
(iii) there is no effective function f taking each n into the number f(n) of 
n-types realized by ?I. Given such a structure %, we can use the proof of 
Theorem 21 to produce a finitely axiomatized truth-theory M over Th(%) 
that characterizes n-satisfaction for each n and yet for which there exists no 
effective function f taking each n into the Godel number f(n) of a formula 
&(x, CK) that characterizes n-satisfaction in M. 
As in the non-finite case, we may obtain necessary and sufficient con- 
ditions for a language by letting the object-theory be a logic: 
THEOREM 22. There is a non-Tarskian finitely axiomatized truth-theory 
for a language L iff L is not purely monadic. 
Proof: *. By Lemma 10 and Theorem 20. 
*. By the same direction of Theorem 15. 
We note that the condition in Theorem 2 is the same as for Theorem 12. 
Thus the requirement that the meta-theory be finitely axiomatizable makes 
no difference as to whether there exists a non-Tarskian truth-theory for a 
given language. 
Turning to the concept of implicit definability, we may establish the 
natural analogue of Theorem 20, and by essentially similar methods: 
THEOREM 23. Suppose that Th(%) is axiomatizable and not finitely 
n-typed. Then there exists a finitely axiomatized meta-theory M that 
implicitly defines truth but not n-satisfaction for a. 
Indeed, in this case, a much stronger result can be established. Gall a 
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structure % arithmetical if I!&[ = w and each relation or function of % is 
arithmetically definable. Then: 
THEOREM 24. Suppose that 113 is elementarily equivalent to an arith- 
metical structure ‘$l and that B realizes infinitely many n-types. Then there 
exists a finitely axiomatized theory M that implicitly defines truth but not 
n-satisfaction for 23. 
I+oof. Without loss of generality, we may suppose that 23 contains no 
distinguished elements or functions. For any n-ary predicate R of the 
language L of 8, let @n(xr, . . . ,x,) be an arithmetical formula that defines 
the arithmetical relation corresponding to R in a. Let L’ be obtained from -- 
L by adding the numerals 0, 1, . . . obtained from 6 by iterated application 
of a function symbol for succcss~~. Construct a meta-theory M fOJ L+ as 
follows. LIM is the result of combining L+ with the language of R and adding 
the truth predicate T(o). The axioms of M are those of R together with the 
arithmetized versions of the following, where in (i) R represents any nary 




foranykr ,..., k,,Rkr...k,istrueiff@n(k, ,..., k,); 
for any sentence Q of L’, - Q is true iff Q is not true: 
for any sentences Q and $ of L’,.(d v $) is true iff Q is true 
or + is true; 
(iv) for any sentence 3x@(x) of L’, 3xf$(x) is true iff e(H) is true 
for some n. 
The axioms (i)-(iv) constitute a substitutional characterization of truth 
in%. 
It is readily checked that M implicitly defines truth for ?I, and hence 
fOJ 23. However, since :M is segregated and Th(%) is not finitely n-typed, it 
follows by Theorem 13 that M does not implicitly define ?z-satisfaction 
for 8. 
We see from the proof that the analogue of Lemma 18 fails. For let 9[ 
be the standard model for arithmetic and let M be the result of adding to 
the minimal meta-theory the recursive axioms for the substitutional inter- 
pretation of truth. Then A! is finitely axiomatized and segregated; it 
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implicitly defines truth for 9l; and yet Th(%) is not axiomatizable. It is 
because of this difference that the method of using segregated meta-theories 
has greater application in regard to implicit definability. 
It would be nice to establish full necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the existence of theories defining truth without satisfaction, as in the pre- 
vious section. A natural conjecture in this direction is: 
(0 There exists a finitely axiomatized non-Tarskian, truth 
theory ni over Tiff T is not finitely n-typed. 
(II) There exists a finitely axiomatized meta-theory M that 
implicitly defines truth without implicitly defining n- 
satisfaction for ‘II iff Th(2f) is not finitely n-typed. 
The conditions here are the same as for Theorems 8 and 15. Thus if the 
conjectures are correct, it means that the finiteness condition can do no 
extra work in forcing a theory of truth to be a theory of satisfaction. 
Although we have not been able to settle either conjecture, we have been 
able to find a construction that may prove the first conjecture and help with 
certain cases of the second. We add, to the minimal meta-theory, variables 
for the following extra sorts of entities: restricted or F-sequences of objects; 
unrestricted sequences of objects; unrestricted sequence indices; and classes 
of unrestricted sequences. We also add extra non-logical constants for the 
following notions: the “inner domain” F of objects; membership between 
unrestricted sequences and classes; an unrestricted value function (Val), 
taking unrestricted sequences and their indices into objects; a restricted 
value function, taking restricted sequences and numbers into objects; an 
unrestricted successor function on the unrestricted sequence indices; and 
satisfaction between restricted sequences and numbers. Finally, we add the 
following finitely many extra axioms: 
(9 theory of successor for unrestricted successor; 
(ii) closure of classes of unrestricted sequences under extensions 
of object-language relations, complementation, union, pro- 
jection, and interchange; 
(iii) embedding: WXVs(s E X 3 3s’ E X A V@‘val(s’, i)) A 
tli(Z+al(s, i) 3 vat@‘, i) = val(s, i))); 
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(iv) a Tarskian theory of truth for F-sequences and F-relativized 
formulas. 
The resulting meta-theory M characterizes truth. For from (i) and (ii), it 
follows that, for each formula of the object language, there is a class that 
is its extension. With the help of (iii), it then follows that each sentence $J 
of L is provably equivalent to its F-relativization @. From (iv) we may 
characterize truth for F-relativized sentences. So truth for arbitrary sen- 
tences Q of L may be characterized as truth of its relativization @. It seems 
plausible, for all of the theories under (I) and for many of the structures 
under (II), that M should fail to characterize or to implicitly define n- 
satisfaction; but we have not been able to prove this. 
However, it can be shown that it is not necessary that T have a con- 
sistcnt, complete and axiomatizable extension in order to enjoy a non- 
Tarskian truth theory. For let T be a theory whose non-logical constants 
are the usual arithmetical predicates, a two-place ordering predicate R, and 
a one-place predicate IV (“is a number”), and whose axioms are those of 
Robinson’s arithmetic relativized to A’, those of an infinite discrete order 
with first element relativized to - #(x), and certain disjointness assump- 
tions stating that the arithmetical predicates apply only to numbers and 
that the ordering predicate R applies only to non-numbers. Let M be the 
meta-theory over T that combines a Tarski satisfaction theory for the 
formulas of L that are relativized to N(x) with a “provability” truth-theory 
for the sentences of L that are relativized to -N(x). Clearly, T is essentially 
undecidable and M is finitely axiomatized. Since a segregation result holds 
for the formulas of L, M will characterize truth for L. But, for essentially 
the same reasons as before, M will not be able to yield the S-sentences for 
formulas of L that are relativized to - N(x). 
4. OTHER CONDITIONS 
We have shown that there exist non-Tarskian truth-theories that (a) are 
finitely axiomatizable and (b) contain a given object-theory. The conditions 
(a) and (b) may be regarded as requirements on a reasonable theory of 
truth. The question then arises as to how stable are our results over the 
satisfaction of further requirements of this sort. 
One such requirement is that the meta-theory M be a conservative 
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extension of the object theory T, i.e., that @ is a theorem ofM, for Q a 
sentence from the language L of T, only if Q is a theorem of T. It is readily 
shown that Tarski’s satisfaction theory is a conservative extension of the 
object-theory; for any model of the latter can be extended in a standard 
way to a model of the former. On the other hand, the provability meta- 
theory of Theorem 17 will not in general be a conservative extension of 
the object-theory, since it will be complete over the sentences from the 
language of that theory. 
What happens, then, when the requirement of conservative extendibility 
is made? The answer turns out to be very simple: 
THEOREM 25. Suppose there exists a non-Tar&an, truth-theoryM over T 
Then there also exists a non-Tarskian, truth-theory M' that is a conservative 
extension of T and that is finitely axiomatized if M is. 
Proof: Let MO be the Tarski theory over T. We may suppose that the 
semantical languages of M and Me contain only a primitive truth predicate 
in common. Now let M' have as its language the union of the languages of 
M and Me, and have as its axioms the disjunction of any conjunction of 
axioms from M with any conjunction of axioms from MO (deleting any 
repetition of conjuncts). 
ThenM’ is a truth-theory for the language L of T. For let its truth- 
predicate T(a) be the common truth-predicate of M and MO. Since M and 
MO are truth-theories: 
for any sentence 4 of L. So since M' contains the common theorems of M 
and MO : 
M’ is non-Tarskian, . For suppose all S-sentences were provable in M' 
relative to the formula L&(x, o). Let M' be the expansion of M to the 
language of M'. Then clearly all of the above S-sentences are provable in 
M'. But on a suitable replacement of the non-logical constants occurring 
in S,(x, ol) but not in the language LM of M, a formula &(x, 01) of LM can 
be found relative to which all S-sentences can be proved in M, contrary to 
our supposition. 
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M’ is an extension of T, since bothM and MU are. It is also a conservative 
extension: since if l-,M, 9, for Q a sentence of L, then b, #, and so h, 9, by 
the conservative extension result for MO. 
Finally, it is clear from the construction that M’ is finitely axiomatized 
ifM is. 
From Theorem 25 it follows that: 
COROLLARY 26. Under the supposition of Theorem 20, there is a non- 
Tarskian, finitely axiomatized truth-theory that is a conservative extension 
of T. It also follows, if the earlier conjecture (I) is true: that (I) remains 
true under the additional requirement that the non-Tarskian truth-theory 
be conservative over T. 
Another requirement concerns the standard interpretation of the object- 
language and of the arithmetical portion of the meta-language. If M is 
conservative over T, then M will be compatible with whatever are the truths 
of I, under some intended interpretation of T. But we may also requireM 
to permit an interpretation that is compatible with the intended interpre- 
tation of the non-semantical parts of its language. Accordingly, let us say 
that M is semantically conservative over T if (a) M extends T and (b) for any 
model U of T there is an arithmetically standard model %‘of M that respects 
U(cf. the definition of implicit definability). Using the theory M’ from the 
proof of Theorem 25, it may be shown that: 
THEOREM 27. Under the supposition of Theorem 25, there is a non- 
Tarskian, truth-theory M’ that is semantically conservative over T and that 
is finitely axiomatized if M is. 
PLoof It suffices to show that M’ satisfies condition (b) above. Pick a 
model 2l for T. Now the Tarski theory MO is semantically conservative over 
T. So there is an arithmetically standard model Vfor MO that respects 9. 
But since each theorem of MO is a theorem of M’, ‘Z? can be expanded to a 
similar model for M’. 
In the light of this result, “semantically conservative” may be substituted 
for “conservative” in Corollary 26 and in the revised formulation of 
conjecture (I). 
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A rather different requirement on a truth-theory concerns the strength of 
its arithmetical part. After all, it would be a kind of deductive freak if it 
were only the absence of certain commonly acceptable arithmetical prin- 
ciples that prevented the derivation of the S-sentences. A weak requirement 
of this kind is that the induction scheme hold for all formulas of the meta- 
language, not just the arithmetical part; and a very strong requirement is 
that all arithmetical truths be at the disposal of the truth-theory. We do not 
know to what extent such requirements might effect the existence of non- 
Tarskian truth theories. A result with full induction is given in Kripke ([3], 
p. 400); but his other assumptions are rather special and involve identifying 
the object-theory with the arithmetical part of the meta-theory. 
There are no doubt other requirements that might be imposed upon a 
truth-theory. Some may limit the scope of our results or conjectures. But 
we are inclined to think, contrary to the drift of Wallace [‘,I, that there is 
no set of general and formal desiderata whose presence will exclude the 
possibility of a non-Tarskian truth theory in a large number of interesting 
cases. 
NOTES 
* This paper had its origin in 1980 in discussions between the authors of some tcch- 
nical questions raised by Kripke in [3]. We would like to thank a referee of this 
Journal for pointing out an error in the formulation of Lemma 10. We also thank the 
proprietors of Drake’s Tea Shop for providing an environment suitable for research. 
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